NEW THREAT LANDSCAPE (NTL): THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MEDIA TOWARDS COUNTER-INSURGENCY AND RADICALISM

Jefferson Gubak & Khairudin Murad[*]
Centre of Media and Information Warfare Studies,
Faculty of Communication and Media Studies, Universiti Teknologi MARA
*khairudinmurad@uitm.edu.my

Abstract

Malaysia experienced the threat of radicalism, extremism, and terrorism since the communist insurgency in 1968 that has led the country under a state of emergency for 21 years. The rise of the Islamic State (ISIS) and Daesh global terrorist network arguably has appeared in different approaches and narratives to bolster their ideology in the minds and hearts of its target audience. The advancement of digitalisation and social media has enhanced the effectiveness of disseminating radical extremist ideology to its audience through aggressive propaganda campaigns throughout all digital platforms. On top of that, the complexity of the New Threat Landscape (NTL) between the blurred lines of counter-insurgency is characterized by single to multiple threats that emerged simultaneously, such as the threat of non-state actors, the use of social media for radicalisation: the rise of extremism; the increase of Islamophobia globally; and the re-emergence of terrorist organisations. Furthermore, the Covid-19 pandemic accelerated the trade of radicalism combining the existing violent extremism narrative with the fear of the pandemic narrative and the economic, social, and political uncertainty. This study aimed to explore and analyse the threat of radicalisation in Malaysia. The study employed a qualitative approach, undertaking in-depth interviews. The finding shows that extreme radicalism in Malaysia is not solely related to religion alone. Political ideology, Racial Ideology, and Communism Ideology also play a significant role in radicalisation in Malaysia. Thus, this research suggested the need to enhance and strengthen the regulation and monitoring of the integrity of social media content and messages to prevent radicalisation in Malaysia.

Keywords: *New Threat Landscape (NTL), Social Media, Counter-Insurgency, Radicalism, Extremism.*

1.0 Introduction

Since its independence, Malaysia has not been spared from the threats of radicalisation that lead to violent extremism and terrorism. Free Malaysia Today (FMT), an online news portal, reported in April 2022 that a specialised team had been established by Bukit Aman Special Branch Counter-Terrorism to closely monitor social media sites to stop the younger generation from becoming involved with extremist organisations that may pose a threat to the security of the country. This is evidenced by the communist insurgency after the early days of Malaysia gained its independence, the threat of Jama'ah Islamiyyah (JI) in the 1990s, Kumpulan al-Maunah and Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM) in early 2000, and the events of al-Qaeda movement until the rise and fall of the Islamic States (IS) or Daesh in 2013-2018 [1]. For example, names such as the late Noordin Mohammad Top, Dr. Azahari Husin, and Yazid Sufaat are among the well-known radicalised Malaysian that have been deeply and actively involved in terrorism from 2000

until 2005. Noordin Mohammad Top or better known as the 'JI's Moneyman' by the regional security forces community, is one of Malaysian-born JI, the top recruiter and strategist in this region have the mastermind behind several suicide attacks in Indonesia during the early 2000s along with his comrade Dr. Azahari [2]. While Dr. Azahari Husin is well-known as the "Demolition Man." He was an Associate Professor of Statistics and Valuation at Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (UTM) from 1991 until 1998 before he was radicalised with violent extremist ideology. He allegedly supplied explosives to the Islamist extremist group Jemaah Islamiah that financed and pledged allegiance to the al-Qa'ida terrorist network [3]. Both Nordin and Dr. Azahari have actively recruited individuals from the region, especially Malaysian and Indonesian, to perform suicide bombings and sought to institutionalise suicide attacks in this region. They were both killed by the Indonesian Security forces in the 2000s. The only known living radicalised Malaysian former member of the JI, Yazid Sufaat, a former detainee, was released from the Simpang Renggam detention Centre on 19 November 2019. Before joining JI, he was a Malaysian army Captain who served as a medical technician. He was well-known for his expertise in weaponising anthrax as a biological weapon for the al-Qaeda-linked terror attack during the early 2000s [4].

According to the Ministry of Home Affairs of Malaysia (MOHA) [5], it was reported that between February 2013 and 31st December 2021, a total of 558 individuals were arrested for allegedly attempting to join Daesh-affiliated groups in Syria and Iraq. Of that number, over 300 individuals are Malaysian. Furthermore, in May 2016, Malaysians were surprised by Daesh media al-Barakah's revelation that four Malaysian nationals pledged their allegiance to Daesh by burning their passports and declaring war against the Malaysian government.

1.1 New Bread of Extremism and Radicalisation

The emergence of the New Threat Landscape (NTL), is more complex and challenging than before [6]. The nature of NTL is characterised by single to multiple threats that emerged counter-insurgency simultaneously, such as the threat of non-state actors, the use of social media for radicalisation, the rise of extremism, the increase of Islamophobia globally, and the re-emergence of terrorist organisations. Subsequently, counter-insurgency and radicalism are not only focused on the sphere of religious belief. Both proclaim exist in other forms, such as political, racial, and other new forms of extreme radicalism. Radicalism has become more effective with the advancement of digital society and platforms. Notably, the rise of Al-Qaeda and Daesh counter-insurgency utilising new media for radicalisation where the radical extremist groups were able to radicalise, mobilise, and synergise acts of terror by using social media [7]. They utilised their propaganda publication through new media aimed to inspire individuals and garner support in Western countries [8]. According to Interpol [9], digitalisation has eased the path to radicalisation, especially among youth and young adults that are considered to become trivial for the success of leftist indoctrination.

The recent Covid-19 pandemic also bred a new form of extremism and radicalisation in the NTL scheme of things. According to the United Nations Institute of Training and Research publication in 2020 [10], the threat of foreign and domestic extremism and terrorism did not decline following available indicators. The pandemic affected millions of people, and distorted religious and far-right extremist groups have exploited the disabling of significant functions and institutions of the world's societies. Radical groups propagate wild conspiracy theories to spread hatred, encourage attacks against vulnerable groups, and sow chaos and distraction meant to overthrow governments and promote the radical agenda of terrorists [11]. This is further compounded by the potential health security threat caused by the anti-vaccine group claiming the vaccination program is unsafe, a global conspiracy, and contrary to religious beliefs [12]. Consequently, NTL is undoubtedly becoming a rising concern nationwide that hybrid counter-insurgency groups will manipulate the pandemic to spread their radical agenda to jeopardise public safety and gain government and public attention.

1.2 Complexity of Technology Based-Threats and Public Safety Concerns

To unravel the answer to this concern, two questions in this study have been posed, namely: 1) What are the portrayal and present characteristics of radical ideology in Malaysia? and 2) What is the force of social media in radicalism in Malaysia? Radicalism has spread fear and menace worldwide, evolving the NTL on many platforms. However, far too little attention has been paid to the rupture of counterinsurgency on social media concerning the behaviour and attitude of the fragile society. Recent trends in NTL have led to a proliferation of studies that the exploitation of social media has facilitated a wide range of networks and affiliations notably during the Covid-19 pandemic outbreak. From online scams, phishing, and various deception of cyber-attacks, terrorist networks have adapted to technology and conducted complex financial support and transactions in the digital world. This study aimed to analyse radical ideology in Malaysia and to understand the role of social media and its impact on the interest in radicalisation. This study has grown in importance in light of recent developments in counterinsurgency and the emergence of NTL in Malaysia to the law enforcement agencies, particularly the Royal Malaysia Police and the security policymakers such as the Ministry of Home Affairs and the National Security Council (NSC). The finding has highlighted references in designing public awareness, preventing, and forecasting future NTL in Malaysia. On top of that, it is decisive to examine how Malaysian individuals are susceptible to radicalism and understand how the COVID-19 pandemic affected radicalisation in Malaysia. Moreover, the findings should make an important contribution to the field of social media towards combating radicalisation and its correlation with NTL.

2.0 Method

This study employed a qualitative framework that was constructed on first-hand observation, interviews, and focus group discussions of several research experts [13]. Due to the complexity of the radicalisation phenomenon, the scope of research is steered in the field of security and counterterrorism. The research sampling employs an in-depth interview with five participants from different areas of expertise in radicalism and counterterrorism, law enforcement agencies, academics, and policymakers. The primary advantage of in-depth interviews is that the technique provides much more detailed information, whereas the researcher relies on data gathered by the researcher from first-hand observation, interviews, and focus groups from a small number of individuals. In-depth interviews provide valuable information for programs, particularly when supplementing other data collection methods. It should be noted that the general rule on sample size for interviews is that when the same stories, themes, issues, and topics emerge from the interviewees, then a sufficient sample size has been reached. Extreme radicalisation leads to violent extremism, and terrorism is not new but frequently pervades both political and social agendas in Malaysia. Hence, the relevant authorities must explore the root causes of the problem from various perspectives that revolve around the question of who is vulnerable to radicalisation, what causes radicalism, why individuals become radicalised, when they are radicalised, and how radicalisation happens. In brief, assessing methodological measurement towards credibility, validity, and reliability of the data is crucial to synthesis questions and the accuracy of the analysis. Therefore, exploratory is the best method for this research, with an in-depth expert interview.

3.0 Findings and Discussion

The exploitation of social media on digital devices with super connectivity and accessibility spreads influential radical ideologies to a mass audience through various propaganda techniques. This phenomenon is elucidated in the Information/ Innovation Diffusion Theory [14]. Daesh has proved that social media effectively radicalised its target audience by disseminating its propaganda in cyberspace and social media. NTL on social media guaranteed the rapid and easily controllable propagation of jihadist ideology toward potential recruits anywhere worldwide. Poster, short video motion, and short animation become creative reasoning and conditioning in mind and heart of the 'weakness'. Therefore, they used cyberspace and its

online platform, notably social media, to disseminate deception and propaganda for recruitment and financing to terrorise an individual's social setting and psychological state [15].

3.1 The Determinants of Religious Radicalism

The common understanding of radical ideology and its relation to violent extremism in Malaysia is its association with religion, specifically Islam. These findings confirmed with El-Muhammady [6] that the history of Malaysia's extremist radicalisation can be traced from 1993 with the emergence of JI, and KMM until the emergence of current Daulah Islamiah Malaysia, who persuaded to pledge allegiance to Daesh. This led to the evidence with the arrest of 362 Malaysians involved with terrorism-NTL-related activities. The notion of radical ideology in Malaysia is often associated with Islam, and most radicalised individuals sympathise with other Muslim minorities beyond Malaysia. The establishment of the Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia, a sympathiser to the struggle of the Afghanistan people during the Afghanistan conflict in 1979-1989 [16]. On top of that, Malaysia's geostrategy location in the Southeast Asia region, sharing a border with the Southern Philippines and Indonesia, forming the Terrorist Threat Triangle of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines (INDOMALPHI), which shared the common religion of Islam, has solidified the associating of Islam in violent extremism specifically in Malaysia. This was then followed by the rising number of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) returning to the region to 'bring back the war to the home front' and the increasing radicalisation number of terror groups pledging bai'ah to Daesh. Moreover, the establishment expanded to prominence of Katibah Nusantara, also called the 'Malay Archipelago Unit for the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria'; a component of Daesh staffed solely by personnel from Indonesia and Malaysia, but some of the indicators of Daesh's influence in Southeast Asia. Citing Samuel T. K [17], he stated that Southeast Asia and its sub-regional territory are not spared from global threats of radicalisation and violent extremism.

Undoubtedly, the successful NTL through social media in radicalisation can be observed during the high Islamic State (ISIS) online propaganda between 2014 and its demise in 2018. This became evident that ISIS has proven to be growing and thriving in inhabiting Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Telegram, WhatsApp and the e-mailing system as a platform for violent extremism propaganda [18]. On top of that, ISIS's uses of social media have effectively developed the "information warfare" doctrinarian of counter-insurgency known as "Ilam al-Jihadi" to wage war on cyberspace to supplement their physical battlefield in the Levant and all over the world. Since 2014, Al-Qaeda and ISIS embarked on an aggressive propaganda campaign using new media and information technology. They used cyberspace to release various online publications such as Inspire, Dabiq and Rumiyah [8]. Moreover, violent extremism and radicalisation are made more accessible through social media, where ISIS's Dabiq magazine is published in various languages, including English, Malay, Bosnian, French, German, Kurdish, Pashto, Russian, Turkish and Uyghur [19]. This is paramount to enable ISIS propaganda to reach its target audiences by utilising an authoritarian religious narrative in its propaganda material [20]. In addition, various languages that have enabled ISIS narratives could easily be localised and tailored to fit the particular communities' readership and dynamics in the different regions, including Malaysia.

3.2 A Radical Prophecy in Political Ideology

NTL in political radicalisation forced by racial tension that occurred during the 13th May 1969 tragedy. The riots began as the discord between the two significant ethnicities in Malaysia, the Malays and the Chinese political parties, occurred after the general election in 1969. The incident was identified by the [21] as extremism involving ethnic, ideological, religious, and political conflict. Notably, the incident involved radical political ideology when ethnic differences and social frustrations occurred in society [22]. Both authors affirmed that extremism and radicalism materialised when a specific political group employed common religious and racial slogans to draw support from a particular ethnic community.

Adding to that, foreign political ideology, at some point, does play a significant role in Malaysia. Foreign ideology refers to an ideology that is non-native to Malaysia. It originated from other countries, and that ideology is a cause of belief based on inevitable political and social struggles in other countries. This is evident from the news report in Sinar Harian in 2019 that the involvement of external elements, such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) movement originating in Sri Lanka, has a considerable number of local supporters in Malaysia. As a result, the police have detected financial transactions that allegedly fund the LTTE activities. In a similar case, on 10th October 2019, the police arrested seven men, including two assembly members, for allegedly supporting, promoting, recruiting, funding and being in possession of items related to Sri Lanka-based militant group Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which had been classified as a terrorist group in Malaysia since 2014. Both assemblymen attended the Melaka LTTE Heroes' Day ceremony on 28 November 2019. They both delivered speeches and openly supported the terrorist group and also found brochures linked to the LTTE. According to the Royal Malaysia Police Special Branch Counter-Terrorism Division (E8), the arrests were made during a series of operations in Kuala Lumpur, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan, Perak, Kedah and Melaka, as reported by the New Straits Times in 2019.

The Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) movement is another example of NTL foreign ideology, which congregates counter-insurgency in their ground operation. The ARSA originated in Myanmar, where the ARSA movement in Malaysia is primarily among foreigners taking refuge in Malaysia. According to the Diplomat online news agency, there is evidence that ARSA and its supporters have been targeting Rohingyas in Malaysia for recruitment. The view that ARSA is weak and ineffective in Malaysia in its outreach to Rohingyas can be partly debunked by the online penetration ARSA has been making in Malaysia. This measure has primarily occurred through social media such as YouTube and Facebook. In 2019, the South China Morning Post reported that the police force arrest of four Rohingyas, including one believed to have links to a pro-ISIS terror cell, has uncovered an extortion racket operating in seven states in Malaysia.

3.3 Representation of Racial and Ethnic Ideology

The study discovered that racial ideology also plays a significant role in radicalism other than religion. In the context of NTL landscape in Malaysia, racial ideology can be exploited as one of the causes of radical and extreme beliefs. The commonly non-radical ideology in Malaysia, such as the 'asabiyah' ideology, also raised the concern of a possible counter-insurgency threat to national security. The ideology of the "State-Asabiyah" (asabiyah kenegerian), for instance, the Philosophy of Kelantan, Bangsa Johor, Sarawak for Sarawakian, Sabah for Sabahan, and Bornean vs Malaya is seen as a potential threat that could affect the national unity of the Federation of Malaysia if not appropriately managed. In the shadow of political movements, this NTL has been proven to manipulate racial motives to incite the asabiyah ideology of the states and races. The involvement of political parties using the Malaysia Agreement 1963 (MA63) 20-point memorandum has justified their state-asabiyah ideology. For example, the Sarawak for Sarawakian and Sabah for Sabahan movements and slogans used by the opposition political parties are grounded by the MA63 20-point memorandum.

The finding supports Grant and Kirton [19] that extremism and radicalism materialise when a political movement manipulates common religious and racial slogans to draw support from a particular ethnic group. Consequently, this has created a sentiment of anti-Federation of Malaysia [23]. This is evident in the political party's campaign during the recent 12th Sarawak State Election in 2021. During the campaign, one political party candidate representing the Sarawak for Sarawakians (S4S) movement posted a video on his TikTok social media account saying, "When staying out of the federation, we may perform better". In a similar case of state-asabiyah ideology, it was reported on 20th August 2019 by Astro Awani news that the slogan "Sabah for Sabahan" in social media has been used by the political party in Sabah to garner support was commented to be unhealthy for the national harmony and security.

Similarly, the state-asabiyah sentiment can also be observed in the context of the slogan "Bangsa Johor." For example, during His Royal Highness Sultan of Johor's opening address at the opening of the

Johor legislative assembly on 16 June 2022, the head of state threatened the Federal Government of Malaysia in his speech when he says, "Don't force the people of Johor to leave Malaysia. Perhaps Johor can be more developed if it stands on its own". This comes after the state ruler expressed his disappointment with some decisions by the federal government that he said appeared to ignore the will of the people of Johor. In this connection, the examples given may pose the potential threat that could affect the national unity and security of the Federation of Malaysia should the royal's statement were to be abused out of context by irresponsible groups or individuals if not managed properly and carefully.

3.4 Re-emerging Threat of Communism

The study also found that other known radical ideologies in Malaysia also pointed to the once terrorising Malaysia, the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) communist counter-insurgency (1968-1989). Although it was once eradicated, The Straits Times, on 26th November 2019 reported that activities indicated the possible resurgence of the CPM in Malaysia, with the covert arrangement of bringing back the ashes of the cremated CPM terrorist leader Chin Peng to Malaysia on 16th September 2019. This event could indirectly convey that Communist ideology remains relevant in Malaysia. In a similar case, The Star reported that the police confirmed in January 2021, raided a restaurant in Juru and Pulau Tikus, Penang, for displaying a photograph of Mao Tze Tong, the founder of communism, as well as a few other photographs of the history of the People's Republic of China's cultural revolution (1966-1976). The images of the said restaurant in Penang have been widely shared and become viral on Facebook and WhatsApp, causing widespread concern among the public. This possible re-emerging trend of the communist ideology in Malaysia coincided with another finding in this research that the Government of Malaysia banned the film produced by China entitled 'The Battle at Lake Changjin' as reported in The Star newspaper on 23rd November 2021. According to the news, the film, released on 21st September 2021, is a Chinese war film featuring elements, such as excerpts of the communist leader's speech that evoke the spirit of communism. The NTL over political and communist sentiments undoubtedly threaten the government and public security. This evidence can be observed when Berita Harian, on 1 December 2019, reported that the police investigated a rally believed to have been attended by former members of the Malayan Communist Party at a private college in Kajang. According to the authority, the private event is feared to be a subversive move to revive the communist movement in Malaysia.

3.5 New and Emerging Threats

The finding is also coherent with Rumetta et al [9], that anti-vaccine groups during the Covid-19 pandemic related vaccination programmes to pharmaceutical conspiracy posed potential health security, contrary to religious beliefs. Therefore, it has established a new narrative called health radicalisation. It is highly potential to become a threat to national security for two reasons. First, it risked hindering or preventing the authority's initiative to control the spread of the pandemic. The second is that it causes public anxiety because people are anxious and afraid of what is happening and the uncertainties of the pandemic-related situation. Without a doubt, because of this pattern, national security is threatened. For example, in Germany, on 15th December 2021, the Guardian online news reported that the German police foiled the Drenden Offlinevernetzung Telegram group in eastern Saxony's attempt to assassinate the state's prime minister, Michael Kretschmer. The Drenden Offlinevernetzung group is known for its anti-vaccination movement. This incident abroad demonstrated that, while health is not typically regarded as a security issue or treated in the same manner as terrorism, it can have a similar impact, at the very least undermining the state's initiative to combat the pandemic. It also demonstrates that social media can be used to spread radical messages to unsuspecting victims, whether online or offline. Thus, in the case of Malaysia, the anti-vaccination group does pose a threat to national health security. This is evident when the group openly voiced their refusal to be vaccinated through social media. Additionally, the local anti-vaccine group used social media to scare the

public of the Covid-19 pandemic and the national vaccination program, creating public anxiety among Malaysians.

4.0 Conclusion

Radicalisation and violent extremism in Malaysia are commonly associated with religion. Nevertheless, NTL and counter-insurgency radicalisation found that political, racial, religious, and communist ideology also play a significant role in radicalisation in Malaysia. The use of social media has effectively transmitted radical ideologies where deception and propaganda have been transmitted to the minds and hearts of network users. The threat of NTL enabled us to understand how radical extremist groups utilised social media to disseminate radical propaganda and radicalise their target audiences. Furthermore, this study's findings have provided an understanding of how the COVID-19 pandemic affected radicalisation and extremist activities in Malaysia. The targeted propaganda during the pandemic can be a continuation of mass propaganda. Targeted propaganda in radicalisation is conducted in an online group gathering or via the advancement of social media. By this, the propagandist targets specifically identified individuals or groups on social media, for example, Facebook. At this stage and type of propaganda, the propagandist will focus his radicalisation of the recruit. The propagandist will indoctrinate its target and amplify its belief in that propaganda to influence the target to submit to their violent extremist activity. In an effort to create public awareness, prevent extremist radicalisation, and predict future patterns and operating procedures of violent extremism/terrorism radicalisation in Malaysia, law enforcement authorities and security policymakers should use the findings as a guide.

This study also provides an opportunity for future research of NTL to expand the relationship in media and information warfare in the everchanging environment that can influence extremist radicalism in Malaysia and devise a strategy to address the issue. Social media content regulation is paramount to prevent and negate radical ideology's propaganda communication to the public. Thus, there is a need to enhance and strengthen the regulation and monitoring of the integrity of social media content and messages. The relevant government agencies, such as the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC) and the Royal Malaysian Police, should continue to work hand in hand in regulating and monitoring the flow of information about radical ideology in social media. Each agency's existing roles and functions, such as the *sebenarnya.my* under the MCMC, could be empowered to negate radical ideology other than addressing the fake news issue.

5.0 References

[1] El-Muhammady, A. (2016). Countering the Threats of Daesh in Malaysia. *Countering Daesh Extremism: Eropean and ASIAN Responses*, 105-122.

[2] Abuza, Z. (2006, July 25). JI's Moneyman and Top Recruiter: A Profile of Noordin Mohammad Top. Publication: Terrorism Focus Volume: 3 Issue: 29. Retrieved January 27, 2022, from The Jamestown Foundation, Global Research & Analysis: https://jamestown.org/program/jis-moneyman-and-top-recruiter-a-profile-of-noordin-mohammad-top/

[3] Collier, K. (2006). Terrorism: Evolving Regional Alliances and State Failure in Mindanao. In D. Singh, & L. C. Salazar, Southeast Asian Affairs (pp. 26-38). Singapore: ISEAS Publishing. doi:https://doi.org/10.1355/9789812306968-005

[4] Joscelyn, T. (2008). Al Qaeda's anthrax scientist. Retrieved january 30, 2022, from Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) Long War Journal: https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/12/al_qaedas_anthrax_sc.php

[5]   Ministry of Home Affairs, Malaysia (MOHA). (2021, April). Unpublished internal statistic from the Ministry of Home Affairs, Malaysia (April 2021). Ministry of Home Affairs Malaysia (MOHA).

[6]   El-Muhammady, A. (2017). External Conflicts and Malaysia's National Security: The Case of Daesh. *The Journal of Defence and Security, 8*(1), 43-58.

[7]   Kumar, N. (2019). Use of Modern Technology to Counter Terrorism. *Centre for Internal and Regional Security*. Retrieved 14th December, 2021, from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333609468_Use_of_Modern_Technology_to_Counter_Terrorism

[8]   Mahzam, R. (2017). Jihadist Propaganda & Information Warfare in Cyberspace. *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses*, 9-14.

[9]   INTERPOL. (2010). Retrieved from Preventing Internet radicalisation of youth requires global police network, INTERPOL Chief tells police summit: https://www.interpol.int/en/News-and-Events/News/2010/Preventing-Internet-radicalization-of-youth-requires-global-police-network-INTERPOL-Chief-tells-police-summit

[10] United Nations Institute of Training and Research (UNITAR). (2020). *Impact of Covid-19 on Violent Extremism and Terrorism.* Retrieved from United Nations Institute for Training and Research: https://UNITAR.org/learning-solutions/publications/impact-covid-19-violent-extremism-and-terrorism

[11] Kruglanski, A. W., Gunaratna, R., Ellenberg, M., & Speckhard, A. (2020). Terrorism in Time of the Pandemic: Exploiting Mayhem. *Global Security: Health, Science and Policy, 5*(1), 121-132.

[12] Rumetta, J., Abdul-Hadib, H., & Lee, Y.-K. (2020). A Qualitative Study on Parents' Reasons and Recommendations for Childhood Vaccination Refusal in Malaysia. *Journal of Infection and Public Health, 3*, 199–203.

[13] Creswell, J. W. (2015). *Educational Research: Planning, Conducting, and Evaluating Quantitative and Qualitative Research (5th Edition).* Boston: Pearson.

[14] Rogers, E. M. (2010). *Diffusion of Innovations* (4th ed.). (Simon, & Schuster, Eds.)

[15] Schmid, A. (2005). Terrorism as Psychological Warfare. *Democracy and Security*, 137-146.

[16] Hassan, H. M. (2013). Mobilisation of Muslims for Jihad: Insights from the Past and their Relevance Today. *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, 5*(10), 10-15.

[17] Samuel, T. K. (2016). *Radicalisation in Southeast Asia: A Selected Case Study of Daesh in Indonesia, Malaysia and The Philippines.* Kuala Lumpur: Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT).

[18] Ibrahim, N. H., Aris, S. R., & Razak, F. H. (2017). The Use of Facebook in ISIS Recruitment-An Exploratory Study. Journal of Media and Information Warfare, 51-77.

[19] Ingram, H. J. (2017). Learning from ISIS's Virtual Propaganda War for Western Muslims: A Comparison of Inspire and Dabiq. In L. J. Maura Conway (Ed.), Terrorists' Use of the Internet (Vol. 136, pp. 170 - 181). IOS Press Ebook.

[20] Vergani, M., & Bliuc, A.-M. (2018). The Language of New Terrorism: Differences in Psychological Dimensions of Communication in Dabiq and Inspire. Journal of Language and Social Psychology, 1-18.

[21] NSC. (n.d). *National security policy contents.* Retrieved from National Security Council: https://www.mkn.gov.my/media/story/English-National_Security_ Policy.pdf

[22] Grant, C. H., & Kirton, R. M. (2007). *Governance, conflict analysis and conflict resolution.* Kingston, Miami, USA: Ian Randle Publishers.

[23] Abd Bakir, Danial Mahmud. (2021). Perjanjian Malaysia 1963 dan Impaknya Terhadap Federalisme Malaysia. Tesis Sarjana. Uinversiti Kebangsaan Malaysia.

NEWS REPORT

Free Malaysia Today 29th April 2022, from Special Unit to monitor those linked with radical, extremist group: https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2022/04/29/special-unit-to-monitor-those-linked-with-radical-extremist-groups/ (2022)

Sinar Harian. Retrieved 10th January, 2022, from Sekat fahaman ekstremis LTTE di Malaysia: https://www.sinarharian.com.my/article/51977/SUARA-SINAR/Pojok/Sekat-fahaman-ekstremis-LTTE-di-Malaysia. (2019).

New Straits Times. Retrieved 10th January, 2022, from Police arrest 7 men, including 2 assemblymen, for supporting LTTE: https://www.nst.com.my/news/crime-courts/2019/10/528695/police-arrest-7-men-including-2 assemblymen-supporting-ltte. (2019).

South China Morning Post. Retrieved 10th January, 2022, from The police force arrest of four Rohingyas, including one believed to have links to a pro-Isis terror cell, has uncovered an extortion racket operating in seven states in Malaysia: https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/3019396/militant-rohingya-group-raises-funds-malaysia-extorting-money?module=perpetual_scroll_0&pgtype=article&campaign=3019396. (2019).

The Diplomat. Retrieved 24th June, 2022, from Rohingya Militant Group Targeting Malaysia-Based Refugees with Online Campaign: https://thediplomat.com/2022/04/rohingya-militant-group-targeting-malaysia-based-refugees-with-online-campaign/. (2022)

Astro Awani. Retrieved 24th June, 2022, from Slogan 'Sabahan for Sabah' hanya merujuk pada perjuangan MA63 - Mohd Shafie: https://www.astroawani.com/berita-politik/slogan-sabahan-sabah-hanya-merujuk-pada-perjuangan-ma63-mohd-shafie-215433. (2019)

Utusan Malaysia. Retrieved 16th June 2022, from Persekutuan jangan cabuli kuasa negeri – Sultan Ibrahim: https://www.utusan.com.my/nasional/2022/06/persekutuan-jangan-cabuli-kuasa-negeri-sultan-ibrahim/. (2022).

New Straits Times. 10th January, 2022, from Group that brought Chin Peng's ashes back to Malaysia slammed: https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2019/11/542358/group-brought-chin-pengs-ashes-back-malaysia-slammed. (2019).

The Straits Times. Retrieved 18th January, 2021, from Exiled Communist Party of Malaya leader Chin Peng's ashes returned to Malaysia: https://www.straitstimes.com/ asia/se-asia/exiled-communist-party-of-malaya-leader-chin-pengs-ashes-returned-to-malaysia. (2019).

The Star. Retrieved 5th January, 2022, from Cops raid restaurant decorated with Communism-inspired wallpaper: https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/ 2021/01/03/cops-raid-restaurant-decorated-with-communism-inspired-wallpaper. (2021).

The Star. Retrieved 10th January, 2022, from Malaysia bans Chinese war movie 'The Battle At Lake Changjin': https://www.thestar.com.my/lifestyle/ entertainment/2021/11/23/malaysia-bans-chinese-war-movie-039the-battle-at-lake-changjin039. (2021).

Berita Harian. Retrieved 10th January, 2022, Polis siasat perhimpunan bekas ahli PKM: https://www.bharian.com.my/berita/kes/2019/12/634101/polis-siasat-perhimpunan-bekas-ahli-pkm. (2019)

The Guardian. Retrieved 20th December, 2021, from German police raids target 'anti-vaxxer murder plot' against state leader: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/15/german-police-conduct-raids-in-saxony-over-anti-vaxxer-plot-dresden. (2021).